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LIST OF PARTIES 
Parties in EnerVest v. Utah State Engineer et al. 
(Section 24 petition filed Feb 28, 2012) 
 
1. EnerVest, LTD, successor in interest to Bill Barrett Corporation – Appellant 
(“EnerVest”) 
2. Michael Carlson – Appellee (“Carlson”) 
3. Utah State Engineer – Appellee (“State Engineer”) 
4. The Willis A. and Wilma Hammerschmid Trust (participated in the district court, 
and filed an appeal, but their appeal has been dismissed) 
5. Garry and Nancy Motte (participated in the district court, but did not file an 
appeal) 
6. Leroy Mead (did not actively participate in the district court or file an appeal) 
7. KFJ Partnership (did not actively participate in the district court or file an appeal) 
8. Iriart Properties, LLC (did not actively participate in the district court or file an 
appeal) 
9. Richard Calder (did not actively participate in the district court or file an appeal) 
 
This matter, EnerVest v. Utah State Engineer (the “Section 24 Hearing”) comes 
to the Court under Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-24, which allows for an expedited resolution 
of certain water rights issues within a general water rights adjudication.  Thus, the 
Section 24 Hearing is just a subset of the above-captioned In the Matter of the General 
Determination of All Rights, both Surface and Underground, within the Drainage Area of 
the Uintah Basin (the “General Adjudication”). 
The General Adjudication was commenced on March 20, 1956.  And in 1964, the 
State Engineer’s Office issued the Proposed Determination of Water Rights by the State 
Engineer, Nine Mile Creek Division (Code No. 47) (the “Proposed Determination”).  
The State Engineer served the Proposed Determination on water claimants within the 
Nine Mile Creek Division.  Relevant to this case, four objections to the Proposed 
Determination were timely filed in 1964:  the Louis Motte Objection, the Amber Keel 
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Objection, the Iriart-Thayn-Dause Objection, and the Sprouse- Hammerschmid Objection 
(collectively the “Objections” with the parties filing the Objections, and their successors, 
denoted “Objectors”).  Neither EnerVest, nor its predecessors in interest, filed an 
objection. 
In 2012, under Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-24, EnerVest’s predecessor sought 
expedited resolution of the water ownership issues raised in the Objections.  The district 
court granted EnerVest’s petition and started the Section 24 Hearing.  As claimants to 
water from Minnie Maud Creek—and therefore parties that would be “directly affected 
by the [Objections],” Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-24(2)—EnerVest and Carlson were also 
parties to both the General Adjudication and the Section 24 Hearing.  [See Order 
Granting Stipulation to Proceed with Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-24 Petition for an Expedited 
Hearing on Objections (“Section 24 Order”), R2 000263, ¶ 2.] 
Relevant Parties in the General Adjudication 
(Started on March 20, 1956, Objections Filed in 1964, and still ongoing) 
 
1. State Engineer 
2. Minnie Maud Reservoir and Irrigation Company (AKA Minnie Maud Irrigation 
Company) (“Minnie Maud”) 
3. Louis Motte – Objector 
4. Amber Keel – Objector 
5. Bernard Iriart, Albert Thayn, and William C. Dause – Objectors 
6. Clyve and Myrtle Mae Sprouse and Willis and Wilma Hammerschmidt – 
Objectors  
 
The full General Adjudication is not on appeal; only the Section 24 Hearing issue 
(i.e., the ownership question raised in the Objections) is before this Court.  Thus, the full 
list of parties for the General Adjudication is irrelevant to this case.  Nevertheless, that 
list is available in case number 560800056 in the Eighth District Court. 
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Parties in Davis v. Christensen et al. 
(Complaint filed May 3, 1957) 
1. Ernest E. Davis 
2. Minnie Maud 
3. Thomas A. Christensen and Bud Christensen 
4. Louis Motte 
5. Amber Keel 
6. Bernard Iriat 
 
Davis v. Christensen is not before the Court, but is somewhat relevant to decisions 
that were made in the Section 24 Hearing.  This was a private lawsuit brought in 1957 by 
Plaintiff Ernest Davis against Defendants Tom Christensen, Bud Christensen, Louis 
Motte, Amber Keel, and Bernard Iriat.  Minnie Maud later intervened as co-Plaintiff.  
The lawsuit sought an order allocated the water rights at issue in this case, and alleged 
that the water rights were owned by Minnie Maud, that water users could only use as 
much water as authorized by their number of shares, and that Defendants had been 
illegally using water beyond their right.  After filing answers and motions, the parties did 
not further pursue this case because of the pending General Adjudication.   
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment ruling, [Ruling on the Parties’ Cross-
Motions for Summary Judgment, R2 001661–78 (the “Ruling”)] that was certified by the 
district court as final and appealable under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) (2016).  [Final Order 
and Judgment, R2 001897-88 (Apr. 14, 2016).]1  This appeal was initially poured over to 
the Utah Court of Appeals, but was later recalled.  The Utah Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) (2016). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the district court correctly entered summary judgment confirming the
Proposed Determination’s listing of Minnie Maud as the owner of the water
rights at issue, where Minnie Maud was legally formed in 1902, where the
predecessors of each party to the Section 24 Hearing expressly conveyed by deed
their water rights to Minnie Maud, and where EnerVest failed to present any
evidence that any original shareholders disputed Minnie Maud’s existence.
A district court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. See 
Harvey v. Cedar Hills City, 2010 UT 12, ¶ 10, 127 P.3d 256 (citation omitted).  This 
issue was raised below.  [R2 001000-12, 001419-44, 001539-70.] 
2. Whether the Court should affirm the district court’s ruling on the alternative
grounds of laches or estoppel.
Laches and estoppel were raised below.  [R2 001009-11, 001441-43, 001565-68.]  
This Court may affirm a grant of summary judgment upon any ground apparent in the 
record.  See Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ¶ 10, 52 P.3d 1158. 
1 EnerVest’s record on appeal is split across two CDs, each separately paginated. 
Disc 1 contains pages 000001 through 004532.  Disc 2 contains pages 000001 through 
002244.  When citing to the Record, Carlson will refer to Disc 1 as “R1” and Disc 2 as 
“R2.” 
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3. Whether the Court should affirm the district court’s ruling on the alternative
grounds that: (a) EnerVest lacks appellate standing where no Objector has
appealed rejection of the Objections; or (b) EnerVest has conceded on appeal
that Minnie Maud was a de jure corporation and the undisputed facts establish
that the original shareholders ratified any alleged ultra vires acceptance of title
to the water rights.
These issues were not decided by the trial court.  EnerVest’s standing before the 
district court is not disputed, and the issue of its appellate standing arose only on the 
Objectors’ failing to appeal.  Similarly, although EnerVest argued against Minnie Maud’s 
de jure status in the district court, EnerVest concedes that status on appeal.  [R2 000891-
92.]  This Court may affirm a grant of summary judgment upon any ground apparent in 
the record, Bailey, 2002 UT 58, ¶ 10, and standing may be raised at any time, Brown v. 
Div. of Water Rights, 2010 UT 14, ¶¶ 12–13, 228 P.3d 747. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In the 1960s, the State Engineer’s office analyzed the water rights on Minnie 
Maud Creek2 and issued the Proposed Determination recommending to the district court 
that the Minnie Maud be decreed as owner of water right numbers 90-24, -184 through -
191 (inclusive), -196, -197, and -299 (the “Water Rights”)3.  A few local individuals 
filed Objections to this conclusion, claiming that Minnie Maud’s shareholders—not their 
irrigation company—should be decreed as individual owners of the Water Rights. 
EnerVest (who is now the sole remaining champion of the Objections on appeal), asserts 
2 Minnie Maud Creek is a tributary of the Green River located in Nine Mile 
Canyon in Carbon and Duchesne Counties about twenty miles northeast of Price, Utah. 
3 EnerVest claims ownership over water right numbers 90-24 and 90-196 only, 
[see Petition for Section 24 Hr’g, R1 004086, 004195, 004102], with the other Water 
Rights split among other users of water from Minnie Maud Creek. 
3 
that a recorded deed conveying the Water Rights to Minnie Maud was void based on an 
unsatisfied condition precedent in the Articles and Agreement of Incorporation of the 
Minnie Maud Reservoir and Irrigation Company (the “Articles”).  In contrast, Carlson, 
who succeeded to roughly 60% of Minnie Maud’s shares [R1 004146], argued in favor of 
the Proposed Determination.  The district court concluded on summary judgment that the 
Proposed Determination correctly determined that Minnie Maud held title to the Water 
Rights. 
Although the following recitation of the facts underlying the Proposed 
Determination and the Ruling is somewhat complex, it provides necessary context for the 
fairly straightforward legal analysis that follows. 
Incorporation of Minnie Maud in 1902 
In April 1902, the Water Rights were owned by individuals owning land along 
Minnie Maud Creek.4  These water users, like so many around the State, were “desirous 
of associating themselves together for the purpose of constructing, purchasing and 
owning water reservoirs, ditches, and canals.”  [Articles, R2 000802–07.]  Accordingly, 
the water users (the incorporators or original shareholders are collectively referred to as 
“Incorporators”) organized Minnie Maud.  [Id.] 
The Articles summarized the intent of the Incorporators, saying “it is intended that 
[Minnie Maud] shall succeed to the property rights of [the Incorporators] in the waters 
and ditches and canals of Minnie Maud Creek.”  [R2 000803.]  The Articles also 
4 A timeline was presented to the district court at the summary judgment hearing 
and is part of the supplemental record on appeal.  For the Court’s convenience, a copy is 
attached as Addendum A. 
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provided that Minnie Maud “does hereby purchase, take, receive, and hold all of the 
water rights now held and claimed by the several incorporators . . . together with all 
canals, dams, locks, gates and weirs used therewith . . . now owned and claimed by the 
individual incorporators hereto.”  [R2 000805.]  In exchange for these contributions, the 
Articles provided that 2,377 shares were issued to the Incorporators.  As listed in the 
Articles, the Incorporators and their respective interests were as follows: 
Incorporator Number of Shares 
David Russell 227 
Bracken Lee-per E.C. Lee 1202 
Johnston & Son 256 
A.O. Smith 143 
T.F. Housekeeper 260 
J.A. Hamilton 68 
E. Anderson 39 
Alonzo Kelger 182 
Total 2377 
[R2 000802.]  The Articles also include the following provision: “[t]his corporation shall 
not be effective for any of the purposes mentioned herein until at least 3,000 shares of the 
unpaid portion of the capital stock shall have been subscribed.”  [R2 000806.] 
Notwithstanding that provision, the Incorporators filed for and received a certificate of 
incorporation for Minnie Maud (the “Certificate”).  [R2 001449, attached hereto as 
Addendum B.]  The Articles and the Certificate were filed with the Carbon County 
Clerk and the Utah Secretary of State.  [Id.] 
As noted by the district court, “‘Right after the company was organized, all the 
water users on Minnie Maud Creek went to work with hand tools, teams and scrapers to 
build the reservoir up Minnie Maud Canyon . . . .’”  [Ruling, at R2 001664 (quoting the 
5 
Anderson Aff., R2 00843-44, attached hereto as Addendum C).]  Then, about six weeks 
after Minnie Maud was incorporated, each of the Incorporators (and other affiliated 
parties) executed a formal deed (the “Deed”) that conveyed “unto [Minnie Maud] and its 
assigns forever,” “all their and each of their rights and claims of every kind and nature 
whatsoever in and to the waters of Minnie Maud Creek . . . .”  [R2 001447, attached 
hereto as Addendum D.] 
Over a series of decades, the Incorporators or their successors-in-interest took 
many actions that treated Minnie Maud as a valid corporation that owned the Water 
Rights.  Soon after formation, the Incorporators appointed a board of directors, which 
held meetings, appointed a water master, and levied assessments.  [Minutes, R2 000909- 
913, 001454-58 (indicating the board appointed J.C. Johnston, one of the Incorporators, 
and EnerVest’s likely predecessor in interest, as water master for $100 per year), attached 
hereto as Addendum E.]5  The Incorporators constructed, maintained, and used water 
delivery structures, including a reservoir in which they stored the water from Minnie 
Maud Creek, which remained in service until it washed out around 1911 or 1913. 
[Addendum D, R2 000843-44, 000988, 001664.]  From 1903 to 1905, Minnie Maud, 
seeking to protect the interests of its shareholders in the Water Rights, initiated a lawsuit 
against a nearby water user (Martha Grames) “to determine and quiet its right to the 
5 The record contains conflicting testimony about whether a water master was ever 
appointed.  [Compare Anderson Aff., Addendum D, at R2 000843-44 (claiming no 
knowledge of a water master) with Minutes, Addendum E, at R2 000909 (appointing a 
water master).]  But even assuming no water master, the undisputed facts establish that 
the Incorporators treated Minnie Maud as a valid entity that owned the Water Rights. 
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waters of Minnie Maud creek, . . . and to enjoin [Martha Grames] from interfering with, 
or from diverting or using, or asserting any rights to the use of [water from Minnie Maud 
Creek].”  Minnie Maud Res. & Irr. Co. v. Grames, 81 P. 893, 893 (Utah 1905); [R2 
001043-47.]6  And between 1902 and 1955, the Incorporators and their successor 
shareholders held and took record of corporate meetings.  [Addendum E, R2 000909-913, 
001454-58, 001664.] 
The Davis v. Christensen Lawsuit in 1957 
In 1957—more than five decades after Minnie Maud was incorporated and after 
all the Incorporators had passed away or otherwise conveyed their land and shares of 
stock—a dispute arose between Ernest E. Davis, then-president of Minnie Maud, and 
some of Minnie Maud’s then-shareholders.  Mr. Davis filed a private lawsuit, Davis v. 
Christensen, asserting that the other water users were using more than their proportionate 
share of the Water Rights.  [See R1 004118-23.]  The Complaint listed the share 
ownership at that time, which is consistent with the Incorporators’ original shares: 
New Shareholder Predecessor(s) Number of Shares 
Ernest E. Davis, Jr. Russell (227) & Lee (1202) 1429 
Thomas Christensen Johnston (256) & Smith (143) ÷ 2 199½ 
Bud Christensen Johnston (256) & Smith (143) ÷ 2 199½ 
T.F. Housekeeper T.F. Housekeeper 260 
Louis Motte Hamilton 68 
Bernard Iriat Anderson 39 
Amber Keel Kelger 182 
Total 2377 
6 The Grames court confirmed Ms. Grames’ ownership of the right to use water 
from Minnie Maud Creek, but it also confirmed that Minnie Maud owned the remainder 
of the rights. [See R2 1304-05]; see also Minnie Maud Res., 81 P. at 894.  No party or 
witness questioned Minnie Maud’s existence.  See id. 
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[See R1 004118.]  The Davis defendants answered the complaint and argued that “by 
reason of the fact that 3,000 shares of stock have never been subscribed [by Minnie 
Maud], neither these defendants nor their predecessors have ever recognized the validity 
of [Minnie Maud] or its right to exercise any corporate powers.”  [See R2 000355-62, 
000364-70, 001317-22.]  These filings are the first instance in the record of anyone 
claiming that the organization and operation of Minnie Maud was somehow invalid. 
The 1957 Davis case did not proceed to trial because, as noted in the next section, 
a parallel litigation—the General Adjudication—arose at about the same time and was 
ultimately better equipped to address ownership and proper use of the Water Rights.7 
Commencement of the General Adjudication 
The General Adjudication traces its origin to July 31, 1950, when a group of water 
users (unrelated to the facts of this case), filed a petition with the State Engineer to 
resolve water rights associated with an unrelated body of water.  [R1 000013.]  The State 
Engineer decided that to properly administer those water rights, it needed to consider all 
water rights in the full Green River and Uintah basin—which included Minnie Maud 
Creek.  [See R1 000013-15.]  The district court agreed, and on March 20, 1956, 
authorized the General Adjudication.  [R1 000022-24.]8 
7 The Davis case is not before this Court.  It is referenced here simply to give 
context because EnerVest relies on this case to support its arguments on appeal.  (See 
Aplt. Br. at 11-12 & nn.7-9, 38 & n.21.) 
8 General adjudications of water rights are extensive, scientifically intensive, and 
often last for decades.  The history of this particular General Adjudication is complex, 
including various relocations, renamings, divisions, and renumberings.  This history was 
8 
The State Engineer sent notices and summonses to all water users in the area and 
began compiling data and surveys of the land and water, as well as correspondence from 
the water users.  [See R2 001016-17.]  Many water users, including Mr. Davis, Minnie 
Maud, and the Christensens (predecessors to EnerVest), were identified and became 
parties to the General Adjudication.  [Cf. R2 001018-31.]  The Water Rights were also 
identified as some of the many water rights that would be adjudicated.  [Cf. id.] 
On August 1, 1962, apparently pursuant to the General Adjudication, Thomas A. 
Christensen—an EnerVest predecessor—wrote a letter to the State Engineer 
acknowledging that Minnie Maud had elected officers and issued stock.  [R1 004130, 
attached hereto as Addendum F.]  He identified himself as an officer, and went on to 
identify himself and his brother (Bud Christensen) as Minnie Maud shareholders.  [Id.]9  
He also identified Mr. Davis as the President of Minnie Maud.  [Id.]  His list of 
shareholders was consistent with that recited in Mr. Davis’s 1957 Complaint.  [See id.] 
The Proposed Determination and Objections 
In March, 1964, after years of work in the General Adjudication, the State 
Engineer issued his Proposed Determination of how the district court should rule 
regarding the ownership and extent of the various water rights.  [R2 001018-31.]  The 
Proposed Determination identified Minnie Maud as the owner of the Water Rights.  [Id.]  
expertly summarized by the State Engineer in the district court below.  [See MIS of State 
Engineer’s Mot. to Determine Scope of Sec. 24 Hr’g, R2 000287-288 n.1.] 
9 The letter stated that “Following is a list of Officers of Minnie Maud Irrigation 
Co. . . . T.A. Christensen (Director),” and that “Following is a list of Stockholders and the 
amount owned by each . . . . T.A. Christensen 199 1/2 (shares). . . Bud Christensen 199 
1/2 (shares). . . .”  [Id. (alterations to ditto marks).] 
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It further expressly rejected any claims by the landowners that they owned the Water 
Rights in their individual capacity.  [See R2 001032.] 
Pursuant to Utah law—which requires all water claimants to file within 90 days 
any objections to a proposed determination10—the Objectors filed four separate 
Objections urging that they, as opposed to Minnie Maud, owned some of the Water 
Rights.  [R2 001052-66.]  The Objectors included only some of the defendants in the 
1957 Davis case.  Specifically, the Hammerschmids (who succeeded to T.F. 
Housekeeper’s position), filed an Objection in connection with the Sprouses, an 
intermediate predecessor.  Similarly, Louis Motte, Bernard Iriat, and Amber Keel each 
filed Objections. 
The Christensens’ interests—the interests under which EnerVest now asserts 
ownership of some of the Water Rights—were not included in any of the Objections. 
[See Section 24 Order, R2 000262-65, attached hereto as Addendum G.]  Indeed, 
EnerVest stipulated and the district court concluded that “EnerVest and Michael 
Carlson’s predecessors in interest did not file Objections objecting to the Proposed 
Determination,” but they would nevertheless be permitted to participate in the Section 24 
Hearing “because they are claimants to the use of water and have a direct interest in the 
issues raised in the . . . Objections.”  [Id. at 00263]; see also Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-24. 
10 The current statute is Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11(2) (2016), which requires all 
claimants to file an objection within 90 days of the Proposed Determination.  The version 
in effect at the time the Objectors filed their Objections was essentially the same, 
including the 90-day requirement.  See Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11 (1953). 
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Post-Objection Period 
After more than sixty years, the General Adjudication is still ongoing.11  In the 
meantime, Minnie Maud was eventually involuntarily dissolved by the State in 
November 1974, but it was never “wound up” as a business.  [See R2 001068.]  In 2000, 
Carlson purchased the ranch land previously owned by Mr. Davis along with all 
associated water rights, which specifically included 1,429 shares in Minnie Maud.  [See 
R2 000956-60.]  Similarly, in 2006, EnerVest’s immediate predecessor, the Bill Barrett 
Corporation (“Barrett”), purchased the lands and water interests previously held by the 
Christensens.  The relevant land and water interests of the Objectors likewise changed 
hands during this period. 
The Section 24 Petition and Scope 
In 2012, Barrett sought for an expedited consideration of the Water Rights by 
filing a petition for review under Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-24.  [R1 004085-107.]  That 
section allows district courts to address smaller portions of the General Adjudications and 
resolve any outstanding objections in an expedited procedure.  See Utah Code Ann. § 73-
4-24.  These mini-cases—or section 24 hearings—help resolve discrete objections and 
provide clarity to water users, even though the General Adjudication is ongoing and no 
final, overarching court decree has been entered.  Under Section 24, a “claimant to the 
11 This is a common pattern in general adjudications, because they cover such a 
large area, involve so many participants, include many water rights, and state and judicial 
resources are limited.  Indeed, at some point in this General Adjudication, the original 
record was lost, and in 1979, had to be reconstituted from the records of the Attorney 
General and State Engineer.  [See R1 004098.] 
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use of water”12 in a General Adjudication “may petition the court to expedite the hearing 
of a valid, timely objection to a report and proposed determination.”  Id. § 73-4-24(1) 
(emphasis added). 
Based on its status as a water claimant, on February 28, 2012, Barrett filed the 
Section 24 Petition, asking the district court to expeditiously hear and resolve the 
Objections.  [R1 004086, 004091, 004103.]  Barrett argued that Minnie Maud was not the 
correct owner of the Water Rights because it had failed to meet the 3,000-share provision 
in the Articles, and therefore the irrigation company never existed and was not authorized 
to receive ownership of the Water Rights.  [R1 004102.]  Barrett also asked the district 
court for declaratory judgment and quiet title in favor of Barrett on the some of the Water 
Rights, even though those water rights were not covered by the original Objections. 
(Soon thereafter, EnerVest acquired Barrett for $375.1 million and took over the 
litigation.)  [See R2 000453, 460-61.]  
The State Engineer, however, opposed the scope of EnerVest’s Section 24 
Petition.  As noted by the State Engineer in the district court below, “Section 24 is a 
unique and rarely invoked component of the adjudication statute,” and due to the lack of 
12 A water “claimant” is not expressly defined by Utah’s water statute.  See 
generally, Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-1-1 to 73-30-202.  It is, however, impliedly broader 
than an “objector,” because every water user who is part of a general adjudication is a 
“claimant,” whereas only those claimants that timely file an objection to a proposed 
determination are “objectors.”  Compare id. § 73-4-1(1)(a) (allowing a group of water 
users to request an investigation “of the rights of all claimants to the water of” a given 
water source) and id. § 73-4-3(2) to (4) (directing the State Engineer to search for and 
serve summons upon “all possible claimants” of water when initiating a general 
adjudication), with id. § 73-4-11(2) (allowing any “claimant who desires to object to the 
state engineer’s proposed determination shall, within 90 days . . ., file a written 
objection”). 
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much guidance in the case law, the State Engineer filed a motion asking the district court 
to determine the scope of the Section 24 hearing to assist the parties in framing the issues.  
[MIS of State Engineer’s Mot. to Determine Scope of Sec. 24 Hr’g, R2 000290.]  The 
State Engineer argued that the district court should limit the Section 24 hearing to 
resolving the Objections that were timely filed in 1964, and not allow EnerVest to expand 
the process into updating ownership to the present (via quiet title and declaratory 
judgment).  Updating the Water Rights beyond the time the 1964 Objections were filed is 
outside the bounds of the General Adjudication statutes.  [Reply, R2 000427.] 
The district court agreed, and ordered that the Section 24 hearing would be limited 
to “the issues timely raised in the 1964 Objections,” which the district court “generally 
restated” as “whether the [Proposed Determination] was correct to list [Minnie Maud] as 
the owner of [the Water Rights].”  [R2 000477-79.] 
Procedural History in the Section 24 Hearing 
The parties that participated in the Section 24 Hearing were the State Engineer, 
Carlson, EnerVest, and two successors to the original Objectors, the Mottes and the 
Hammerschmid Trust.  The other successors to the Objectors and users of water from 
Minnie Maud Creek were given notice of the proceeding, but they elected not to actively 
participate.  After conducting extensive discovery, Carlson, EnerVest, and the 
Hammerschmid Trust brought dueling summary judgment motions to resolve the sole 
issue before the district court—whether the Proposed Determination correctly listed 
Minnie Maud as owner of the Water Rights. 
13 
EnerVest moved for summary judgment, arguing first that Minnie Maud never 
existed because it had failed to comply with the laws of incorporation (either as a de jure 
or de facto corporation).  [R2 000891-93.]  It further argued that because Minnie Maud 
issued only 2,377 shares, it was never authorized to accept delivery of the Deed 
conveying the Water Rights.  [R2 000894-96.]  The Hammerschmids also moved for 
summary judgment, raising similar arguments.  [R2 000798.]  (Although the Mottes did 
not move for summary judgment, they raised similar arguments in their briefing 
responding to Carlson’s summary judgment motion.)  [R2 001371.] 
Carlson cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing that even though Minnie 
Maud only issued 2,377 shares, the original Incorporators had waived any requirement 
that additional shares be issued, and the Objectors, as successors to the Incorporators, 
were therefore barred from relying on that 3,000-share provision more than 55 years 
later.  [R2 1004-11.] 
The district court issued its Ruling resolving all the pending summary judgment 
motions.  [R2 001661-78.]  The Ruling identified the undisputed facts.  [R2 001661-67.] 
Based on these undisputed facts, the court concluded that Minnie Maud had been brought 
into existence as a properly formed “de jure” corporation.  [R2 001661-67.]  The district 
court reasoned, however, that even though Minnie Maud existed as a corporate entity, it 
had not been duly authorized to receive property because the 3,000-share threshold had 
not yet been met.  [R2 001670-71.] 
The district court nevertheless concluded that the undisputed documents and 
conduct in the evidence demonstrated as a matter of law that the Incorporators had 
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waived the 3,000-share provision.  [R2 001673-74.]  The court based its decision 
primarily on the Deed [Addendum D, R2 001447], noting that this was enough to 
establish that the Incorporators, knowing of the 3,000-share provision, nevertheless chose 
to ignore it and treat Minnie Maud as if it had the authority to own the Water Rights.  [R2 
001674 (“The Court finds that the shareholders’ act of executing and delivering a deed of 
the Water Rights to Minnie Maud demonstrates the shareholders’ clear intention of 
waiving performance of a condition precedent and treating the agreement as in effect.”).] 
EnerVest’s appeal seeks only the reversal of the portion of the Ruling granting 
Carlson’s summary judgment motion.  (Aplt. Br. at 15 & 43 (“Summary judgment based 
on the Deed alone was error and should be reversed.”).)  EnerVest has NOT asked this 
Court to reverse the district court’s denial of its motion.  (See generally id.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
EnerVest seeks to overturn the Ruling on the grounds that the district court did not 
properly view the facts in the light most favorable to EnerVest, and that the result of the 
decision is now at odds with the Proposed Determination.  These arguments fail, 
however, because the district court correctly took the undisputed facts and all the 
inferences reasonably flowing therefrom on the evidentiary record in the light most 
favorable to EnerVest, and nevertheless concluded as a matter of law that the Proposed 
Determination correctly identified Minnie Maud as the owner of the Water Rights. 
Moreover, EnerVest’s assertion that the Ruling creates inconsistency within the Proposed 
Determination is an unpreserved red herring and an improper expansion of the Section 24 
Hearing.  This Court should affirm. 
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Argument I:  EnerVest lacks standing to pursue this appeal because none of the 
Objectors appealed, and EnerVest cannot simply adopt the rights of an objector on 
appeal.  Objections to a Proposed Determination are carefully circumscribed by statute, 
and EnerVest and its predecessors admittedly did not file a timely objection.  EnerVest’s 
statutory right to initiate a Section 24 Hearing as a claimant does not also grant it the 
rights and powers conferred to Objectors.  And where no Objector has appealed the 
Ruling, EnerVest is by this appeal attempting, despite the objection deadline having 
expired more than fifty years ago, to file its own objection to the Proposed 
Determination.  Furthermore, even if EnerVest has standing to bring this appeal, it has 
conceded that Minnie Maud existed as a corporation.  Therefore, Minnie Maud’s claimed 
nonexistence—the only basis on which EnerVest argues the invalidity of the deed—
cannot be sustained.  The deed to Minnie Maud was not void.  Minnie Maud’s acceptance 
of title was, at most, an ultra vires act that was ratified by the Incorporators. 
Argument II:  Even setting aside EnerVest’s lack of standing and its concessions, 
the district court correctly found the Incorporators waived the 3,000-share provision of 
the Articles.  The undisputed facts, even when viewed in the light most favorable to 
EnerVest, support no other reasonable conclusion.  After filing the Articles and obtaining 
a certificate of incorporation, the Incorporators constructed a reservoir as contemplated 
by the Articles, they signed a Deed expressly conveying the Water Rights to Minnie 
Maud, they prosecuted a lawsuit and appeal in the name of Minnie Maud as owner of the 
Water Rights, and they participated in corporate governance and formalities.  Indeed, 
neither EnerVest nor any other party has pointed to any admissible evidence that the 
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Incorporators ever challenged Minnie Maud’s existence or ownership of the Water 
Rights.  To the contrary, EnerVest’s own predecessor affirmatively represented to the 
State that Minnie Maud existed and had officers and shareholders.  As such, the district 
court correctly ascertained the undisputed facts in the record and any reasonable 
inferences therefrom, and did not err in refusing the speculations or unsupportable 
inferences proposed by EnerVest. 
Argument III:  EnerVest’s argument that the summary judgment ruling is 
inconsistent with the Proposed Determination should be rejected because EnerVest failed 
to preserve this argument below.  And even if it had preserved the issue, EnerVest’s 
argument misappraises the result of Minnie Maud’s ownership.  Although many water 
right owners also own the land on which the water is authorized for use, there are plenty 
of examples in which ownership of the water right is separate and distinct from 
ownership of the land.   
Argument IV:  The district court’s grant of summary judgment can also be 
affirmed on two additional bases that the district court did not reach.  Because EnerVest’s 
predecessors did not dispute Minnie Maud’s existence or ownership of the Water Rights 
from 1902 to 1957, and Carlson and his predecessors relied on Minnie Maud’s existence 
and their associated stock ownership to buy and sell their property, the doctrines of laches 
and estoppel bar EnerVest from now claiming that Minnie Maud never existed. 
ARGUMENT 
The Proposed Determination correctly identified Minnie Maud as the owner of the 
Water Rights because the undisputed evidence presented to the district court uniformly 
17 
and unequivocally demonstrates that the original Incorporators:  (1) treated Minnie Maud 
as a valid and existing corporation; (2) employed that corporate form in protecting their 
collective water interests from third-party threats; and (3) actually executed a Deed 
conveying the Water Rights to Minnie Maud.  Indeed, neither EnerVest nor the other 
parties in the district court presented any evidence that the original Incorporators—as 
opposed to their successors more than 50 years later—ever challenged Minnie Maud’s 
existence based on its issuance of only 2,377 shares.13   
Accordingly, the Court should affirm the Ruling because, as further discussed 
below:  (I) EnerVest either lacks standing to appeal or has conceded the dispositive issue 
on appeal; (II) the Ruling correctly determined that the Incorporators waived any 
requirement that additional shares be issued such that Minnie Maud received title to the 
Water Rights; (III) EnerVest’s assertion that the district court’s ruling is inconsistent with 
the Proposed Determination is an improper attempt to expand the scope of the Section 24 
Hearing and was never raised below; and (IV) the equitable doctrines of laches and 
estoppel bar any challenge to Minnie Maud’s existence.   
13 Because discovery is complete on the issue of ownership [see R2 000465], and 
because EnerVest and the other parties were obliged to provide any such evidence both in 
discovery and to establish any factual dispute on summary judgment, see Utah R. Civ. 
Proc. 26, 33, and 56, the Court may properly conclude that there is no admissible 
evidence that the original Incorporators ever disputed Minnie Maud’s existence. 
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I. ENERVEST LACKS STANDING TO APPEAL AND HAS CONCEDED 
THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE OF MINNIE MAUD’S EXISTENCE 
EnerVest raises multiple arguments on appeal, but this Court need not reach those 
arguments because, as further discussed below, EnerVest lacks standing to pursue this 
appeal and has conceded the dispositive issue of Minnie Maud’s corporate existence.   
A. EnerVest Lacks Standing to Appeal Where No Objector Has Appealed  
Although there was no question that EnerVest had standing to initiate the Section 
24 Hearing with the purpose of resolving the Objections in the district court, EnerVest’s 
standing was limited to its rights as a water “claimant.”  If the Objectors had withdrawn 
their Objections in the district court, EnerVest would be wholly powerless to argue the 
Objections’ efficacy.  Likewise, because no Objector is appealing the district court’s 
rejection of their Objections, EnerVest no longer has any Objection to support. 
The State legislature created the water rights adjudication statutes nearly a century 
ago.  In 1919, the legislature passed the first modern version of the framework governing 
water rights.  See Laws 1919, pp. 177-203, §§ 1-80.  That framework remains mostly 
unchanged:  generally speaking, after the court initiates a general adjudication of water 
rights, the State Engineer is tasked with surveying the area, locating all possible water 
claimants, and submitting a proposed determination of water rights to the court. 
Compare id. with Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-1 to -24.  Water claimants then have ninety 
days to file an objection.  Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11(2).  The general adjudication, 
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however, is not concluded until all objections are resolved.14  This means that general 
adjudications, which can have hundreds of objections, often take decades before a final 
decree can be issued.  See, e.g., In re Gen. Determination of Rights to Use of Water of 
Price and Green Rivers, 2008 UT 25, 182 P.3d 362 (ongoing since 1956); In re Gen. 
Determination of Rights to Use of All Water, Both Surface & Underground, Within 
Drainage Area of Utah Lake & Jordan River in Utah, Salt Lake, Davis, Summit, 
Wasatch, Sanpete & Juab Ctys. in Utah, 1999 UT 39, 982 P.2d 65 (ongoing since 1944). 
Recognizing that general adjudications sometimes span decades, any water 
“claimant” in a general adjudication has the right to petition the court to take smaller 
portions of general adjudications and resolve any outstanding objections in an expedited 
procedure.  See Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-24.  These section 24 hearings help resolve 
discrete objections and provide clarity to water users, even though the General 
Adjudication is ongoing and no final, overarching court decree has been entered.  Under 
section 24, a “claimant to the use of water” need not have been an objector to initiate an 
expedited hearing; it only need show it “has a direct interest” in the resolution of the 
objection.  Id. § 73-4-24(1). 
14 This rule is clear and has been since the beginning:  “[i]f no contest on the part 
of any claimant shall have been filed, the court shall render judgment in accordance with 
such proposed determination . . . .”  Laws 1919, c. 67, §§ 32-33 (emphasis added) 
(codified in R.S. 1933, § 100-4-11 & -12.)  That requirement remains unchanged to this 
day.  Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-12 (2016).  Thus, as soon as there is no timely objection 
before the court, “the court shall render judgment” in favor of the proposed 
determination.  Id. 
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The statute does not expressly define a claimant’s standing during a Section 24 
Hearing in the district court, and it does not expressly indicate whether a non-objecting 
claimant can seek an appeal.  But an examination of the adjudication statute as a whole 
together with general legal principles circumscribes standing at both stages.15  Moreover, 
EnerVest’s standing on appeal is not dependent on “injury, nexus, or redressability, but 
party status.  Thus, to be legally eligible—or in this sense to have standing—to 
participate in certain proceedings, a person or entity must also qualify as a proper party.”  
State v. Brown, 2014 UT 48, ¶ 15 n.2, 342 P.3d 239, 242 n.2 (emphasis in original). 
Section 24 hearings are not a second bite at the apple.  They are merely an 
expedited hearing of all objections that were timely filed.  Thus, although claimants have 
a right to spur action on the timely objections, Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-24(1), they 
themselves lack standing to bring new objections or to inject new issues, see id. § 73-4-
11(2).  Their standing is limited to the initiation of the hearing in the district court, and 
only piggybacks on the objectors that timely filed their objections to the proposed 
determination within “90 days.”  Id. § 73-4-11(2).   
Claimants are not the same as objectors under the statute.  Objectors are water 
claimants who have met the statutory requirement to file their objections to proposed 
15 This Court has used a similar approach when evaluating a related statute, the 
Water Conservancy Act, 17a-2-1401 to -1454 (repealed May 6, 2002).  See Washington 
Cty. Water Cons. Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, ¶¶ 7-10, 82 P.3d 1125, 1128.  In 
Washington County, this Court noted that although conservancy districts were directed to 
serve the public’s interest in the administration of water, the structure of the statute in 
question did not give rise to an implied statutory standing to seek forfeiture of private 
water rights.  Id.; see also Rupp v. Moffo, 2015 UT 71, ¶ 9, 358 P.3d 1060, 1062 
(concluding a creditor had “statutory standing” under United States Bankruptcy Code, in 
part, because of the structure and language in the code). 
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determination within “90 days.”  Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11(2).  The ninety-day threshold 
is applied rigorously under the statute, and has been since its inception.  For example, in 
United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., the San Rafael general 
adjudication was started in 1950.  2003 UT 49, ¶ 3, 79 P.3d 945.  The State Engineer took 
thirty years to survey the water rights in the area, and issued the proposed determination 
on December 1, 1982.  Id.  Claimant United States Fuel (“USF”) filed its objection 
“ninety-one days later.”  Id. ¶ 4.  The Court recognized that “USF filed an objection one 
day late,” but it went on to hold that “[i]ts tardiness had consequences.  Unless and until 
USF sought and obtained leave of court in the general adjudication to excuse its tardy 
objection, [the other water user] was entitled to judgment perfecting the state engineer's 
proposed award . . . .”  Id. ¶ 17.  The Court noted “if the claimant makes no objection, he, 
by his silence, confesses the statements contained in the engineer’s proposed 
determination of his water rights, and thus a judgment may legally be entered in 
accordance with the proposed determination of the engineer.”  Id. ¶ 19 (quotation marks 
and alterations omitted); see also Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, ¶ 32, 84 
P.3d 1134, 1145 (noting the water claimant in that case has “long acquiesced” to the 
proposed determination because it had failed to file a timely objection). 
It is undisputed that neither EnerVest nor its “predecessors in interest . . . file[d] 
Objections objecting to the Proposed Determination.”  [Addendum G, R2 000263.]  As 
such, EnerVest’s ability to participate in the Section 24 Hearing was dependent on the 
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fate of the Objections that were timely filed by the Objectors.16  EnerVest’s silence in 
1964 is deemed as having “confess[ed] the statements contained in the engineer’s 
proposed determination.”  United States Fuel, 2003 UT 49, ¶ 19. 
None of the Objectors have pursued their Objections on appeal.  As such, 
EnerVest has no ability to ride the Objectors’ coattails to an appeal that no Objector filed.  
Said differently, EnerVest cannot be the sole appellant challenging a decision confirming 
the Proposed Determination because EnerVest never filed an objection and is presumed 
to have agreed with the Proposed Determination.  “A claimant who fails to file a timely 
objection to the proposed determination demonstrates acquiescence to the state engineer’s 
delineation of water rights.”17  In re Gen. Determination of Rights to Use All of Water, 
Both Surface & Underground, Within Drainage Area of Utah Lake & Jordan River in 
Utah, Salt Lake, Davis, Summit, Wasatch, Sanpete, & Juab Ctys., 2004 UT 67, ¶ 22, 98 
P.3d 1, 6.  Thus, EnerVest’s appeal fails because it lacks statutory standing.   
16 The statutory framework for adjudicating water rights allows any “claimant to 
the use of water” to ask the district court to “expedite the hearing of a valid, timely 
objection.”  Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-24(1).  That section, however, confers the standing to 
expedite timely filed objections only; it does not confer standing to then prosecute the 
objections throughout the rest of the potential judicial process, such as appeals.  The 
standing to do so is dependent on the original objector’s, or its successor in interest’s 
continued prosecution of that objection.  In that sense, a non-objecting claimant in a 
Section 24 Hearing (e.g., EnerVest) acts more like an amicus than a party. 
17 Of course, a water claimant that did not object to a proposed determination may 
appeal a district court decree different from the proposed determination.  In that instance, 
a non-objector water claimant’s appeal is consistent with its position throughout the 
adjudication process, and the claimant would merely be championing the determination 
of its rights as presented in the proposed determination.   
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B. EnerVest Has Not Challenged the Legal Existence of Minnie Maud 
In its Appellate Brief, EnerVest concedes that the Incorporators “complied with 
the law” in filing the Articles, that the Articles “‘contain the statement of facts required 
by law, and that said corporation is hereby constituted a body corporate.’”  (Aplt. Brief at 
17–18 (quoting R2 1449).)  But EnerVest also uses language that might be read as an 
assertion that Minnie Maud had a “conditional existence,” and that the Incorporators 
“failed [their] attempt to incorporate Minnie Maud.”  (Aplt. Br. at 2, 13; see also id. at 
14; id. at 22 (“Minnie Maud’s very existence and power to function . . . were expressly 
conditioned on the Share Requirement.”).) 
Nevertheless, at no point in its appeal did EnerVest specifically challenge the 
district court’s conclusion that Minnie Maud was validly formed as a de jure corporation.  
(See generally, id.)  Rather, EnerVest admits that “[t]he form of the corporation was 
complete, but its substantive operation, its prospective function, its power, and the 
obligations of the contracting parties, were not.”  (Id. at 25 (emphasis in original).)  Thus, 
EnerVest has conceded Minnie Maud’s creation as a de jure corporation because 
“‘[i]ssues not briefed by an appellant are deemed waived and abandoned.’”  Rukavina v. 
Triatlantic Ventures, Inc., 931 P.2d 122, 125 (Utah 1997) (quoting Am. Towers Ass’n Inc. 
v. CCI Mechanical Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1185 n. 5 (Utah 1996))); see also Allen v. Friel,
2008 UT 56, ¶ 7, 194 P.3d 903 (“If an appellant fails to allege specific errors of the lower 
court, the appellate court will not seek out errors in the lower court’s decision.”). 
Accordingly, in contrast to EnerVest’s arguments before the district court that 
Minnie Maud was neither a de jure nor de facto corporation, EnerVest now seeks to draw 
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a fine distinction between Minnie Maud’s legal existence and Minnie Maud’s ability to 
act under the terms of its Articles.  But to the extent that such a distinction could even be 
made, Minnie Maud’s mere corporate existence is dispositive in favor of the Ruling.   
Foundational to EnerVest’s case is the principle that “entities that do not exist . . . 
cannot own anything.”  (Aplt. Brief at 22 (citing Sharp v. Riekhof, 747 P.2d 1044, 1046 
(Utah 1987).)  But EnerVest cites no support for the proposition that a deed to a de jure 
corporation is void.  Rather, Minnie Maud’s acceptance and recording of the Deed was, 
at most, an ultra vires act that was voidable under Utah law.  See Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 
UT 37, ¶ 18, 189 P.3d 51 (holding ultra vires deed from trustees voidable rather than 
void).  Indeed, the Ockey Court held that a deed from trustees of a terminated trust, where 
the trustees “lacked . . . authority[,]” was merely voidable, not void.  Id. ¶¶ 17–24. 
Further, this Court has unequivocally held that a deed is “void ab initio” only if it violates 
public policy.  Id.; see also Bank of America v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2, ¶ 21; ___ P.3d ___ 
(“This court has recognized only one kind of deed as void ab initio; i.e., a deed that 
violates public policy.” (italics in original)).  And a voidable Deed is “valid against the 
world, including the grantor, because only the injured party has standing to ask the court 
to set it aside.”  Ockey, 2008 UT 37, ¶ 18.   
Applying these principles to the Minnie Maud Deed, EnerVest has not argued, nor 
could it, that the Deed is void because it somehow violated public policy.  Rather, the 
Incorporators—the only parties that had standing to enforce any requirement that Minnie 
Maud needed to issue additional shares—were the only parties potentially injured by 
Minnie Maud issuing only 2,377 shares.  And just like the trust beneficiary in Ockey, who 
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“signed a document directing the trustees to” execute the deed and who accepted the 
benefits from the conveyance, id. ¶ 27, the Incorporators actually signed the Deed and 
accepted the benefits of Minnie Maud ownership.  Accordingly, the Incorporators ratified 
Minnie Maud’s acceptance of the Deed even though accepting title might have otherwise 
been considered an ultra vires act.  Alternatively, as discussed in greater detail in Part IV 
below, the grantors and their successors are at the very least estopped from seeking to set 
aside the Deed.  Id. ¶ 22 (“By the great weight of authority it is well recognized that there 
is a distinction between an illegal or void contract and one merely ultra vires, which 
could become enforceable by ratification or estoppel.” (internal quotation marks and 
alterations omitted)) 
EnerVest nevertheless asserts that the Incorporators were merely “start[ing] to 
comply with the Articles and the Share Requirement” when they executed the Deed. 
 (Aplt. Br. at 14.)  This assertion is speculative at best.  If EnerVest were correct that the 
Deed was void, and if the Incorporators are imputed to know and understand what 
EnerVest alleges to be the law, then the Incorporators’ actions—filing for and obtaining a 
certificate of incorporation that was also in the public record [Addendum C, R2 001449], 
knowingly executing a purportedly void Deed to Minnie Maud “and its assigns 
forever” [Addendum D, R2 001447], recording it in the public record [id.], participating 
in court proceedings extending to the Utah Supreme Court on the basis of the Deed, 
and leaving those records unmodified and unchallenged for over half a century—would 
be the height of duplicity.  This is not the case.  The only reasonable and plausible 
inference to be 
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gained from the Deed is that the Incorporators intended for Minnie Maud to exist and to 
take ownership of the Water Rights, even though only 2,377 shares were issued. 
Therefore, given EnerVest’s concession on appeal that Minnie Maud was a de jure 
corporation, the Court has more than adequate grounds on the record to affirm the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment on the basis that the Deed was, at most, voidable as 
an ultra vires act, but the Incorporators by their actions and silence ratified Minnie 
Maud’s acceptance of the Deed. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY FOUND WAIVER ON THE
UNDISPUTED FACTS
Even if the Court were to conclude that EnerVest has standing to pursue this
appeal and has not conceded the dispositive issue on appeal, affirmance of the Ruling is 
nevertheless warranted because the district court correctly found the Incorporators had 
waived the 3,000-share provision of the Articles. 
It is well settled that the Articles of Incorporation of a corporation form the basis 
of a contract, among others, between the corporation and its stockholders.”  Fower v. 
Provo Bench Canal & Irr. Co., 99 Utah 267, 101 P.2d 375, 376 (1940)  And, “[p]arties to 
a written contract have the right to modify, waive, or make new contractual terms . . . 
even despite the presence of express contractual language to the contrary.”  Glenn v. 
Reese, 2009 UT 80, ¶ 23, 225 P.3d 185, 191 (quotations and citation omitted).  “Waiver 
of a contractual right occurs when a party to a contract intentionally acts in a manner 
inconsistent with its contractual rights, and, as a result, prejudice accrues to the opposing 
party or parties to the contract.”  Meadow Valley Contractors, Inc. v. State Dep’t of 
27 
Transp., 2011 UT 35, ¶ 45, 266 P.3d 671, 682–83 (quotations omitted). 
EnerVest focuses its argument on the summary judgment standard, noting that 
because the deed conveying the Water Rights to Minnie Maud in 1902 “did not expressly 
waive anything, the district court had to infer waiver.”  (Aplt. Br. at 26.)  EnerVest also 
argues that the district court “overlook[e]d other plausible, conflicting inferences.”  (Id. at 
27.)  But EnerVest cannot point to any admissible evidence that the original Incorporators 
challenged Minnie Maud’s ownership on any basis, including the 3,000-share provision 
of the Articles.  Instead, the Deed shows that the Incorporators had an intent to convey 
the Water Rights to Minnie Maud, and the Incorporators’ undisputed actions that 
followed were inconsistent with the 3,000-share provision. Allowing an Incorporator’s 
successor to now enforce the 3,000-share provision would prejudice parties like Carlson 
and his predecessors who have relied on the existence of Minnie Maud for over a century. 
The Articles state that “it is intended that [Minnie Maud] shall succeed to the 
property rights of [the Incorporators] in the waters and ditches and canals of Minnie 
Maud Creek.”  [R2 000803.]  The Articles also state that Minnie Maud “does hereby 
purchase, take, receive, and hold all of the water rights now held and claimed by the 
several incorporators . . . together with all canals, dams, locks, gates and weirs used 
therewith . . . now owned and claimed by the individual incorporators hereto.”  [R2 
000805.]  These same Incorporators immediately commenced working together to 
improve and expand the water delivery mechanisms owned by Minnie Maud. 
[Addendum D, R2 000843-44, 000988, 001664.]  And they ultimately built a reservoir, 
which they operated and maintained until it was washed out in 1911 or 1913. 
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[Addendum D, R2 000843-44.]  During construction of the new reservoir, the 
Incorporators executed the Deed, which conveyed “all their and each of their rights and 
claims of every kind . . . in and to the waters of Minnie Maud Creek . . . unto the [Minnie 
Maud] and its assigns forever.”  [Addendum D, R2 001447.]  From 1903 to 1905, the 
Incorporators participated in a lawsuit and appeal to this Court to protect their interests in 
Minnie Maud Creek, with Minnie Maud as the named plaintiff.  Minnie Maud Res. & Irr. 
Co. v. Grames, 81 P. 893, 893 (Utah 1905) [R2 001043-47].  Between 1902 and 1955, 
the Incorporators and their successor shareholders held and took record of corporate 
meetings.  [Addendum E, R2 000909-913, 001454-58, 001664.]  And indeed, one of 
EnerVest’s own predecessors-in-interest wrote a letter on Aug. 1, 1962 to the State 
Engineer as part of the General Adjudication and affirmatively represented that he was 
one of Minnie Maud’s directors, and that he and his brother owned shares in the 
company.  [Addendum F, R1 4130.] 
EnerVest lines up those facts and characterizes them as giving rise to an equally 
plausible inference that “[t]hese are the acts of incorporating, not the acts of waiving the 
terms and conditions of the express agreement to incorporate.”  (Aplt. Br. at 27 (emphasis 
added); see also id. at 14 (“Far from waiving the Share Requirement, the only express 
inference the Deed supports is the intention to start to comply with the Articles and the 
Share Requirement.” (emphasis in original)).  EnerVest’s inference, however, is not 
plausible based on the undisputed facts.  “[W]hile an appellant who is challenging a 
summary judgment entered against it is entitled to all favorable inferences, it is not 
entitled to build a case on the gossamer threads of whimsy, speculation and conjecture.” 
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JENCO LC v. Perkins Coie LLP, 2016 UT App 140, ¶ 15 (quotation marks and 
alterations omitted).  “[U]nsubstantiated conclusions and opinions are inadmissible.”  
Cabaness v. Thomas, 2010 UT 23, ¶ 33, 232 P.3d 486, 498.  A plaintiff cannot avoid 
summary judgment based on doubtful, vague, speculative or inconclusive evidence. 
Heslop v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2017 UT 5, ¶ 21, ___ P.3d ___; see also Kranendonk 
v. Gregory & Swapp, PLLC, 2014 UT App 36, ¶ 15, 320 P.3d 689 (“A reasonable
inference exists when there is at least a foundation in the evidence upon which the 
ultimate conclusion is based, while in the case of speculation, there is no underlying 
evidence to support the conclusion.” (quotations omitted)). 
Said differently, EnerVest would have this Court agree that it is reasonable and 
plausible that a group of Incorporators (1) wrote extensive Articles summarizing their 
intent that Minnie Maud hold the Water Rights, (2) built the reservoir contemplated by 
the Articles and maintained it for multiple years, (3) executed a formal deed conveying 
the Water Rights to Minnie Maud “forever,” (4) appointed directors, had shareholder 
meetings, hired a water master, pursued lawsuits, and generally acted like a going 
concern for decades, (5) prosecuted a case to the Utah Supreme Court to quiet title to the 
Water Rights in Minnie Maud, and (6) affirmatively represented to a state agency that 
Minnie Maud still had directors and shareholders over 50 years later—but that all of these 
facts could be explained as an intention to start the incorporation process, and that the 
Incorporators did not intend for Minnie Maud to actually exist and hold the Water Rights 
until 3,000 shares had been issued.  EnerVest’s argument exceeds the bounds of 
plausibility.  Its position would require the Court to ignore at least fifty years (from 1902 
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to 1957), if not more, that indisputably establish Minnie Maud existed, owned the Water 
Rights, and was never challenged by the original Incorporators. 
The undisputed facts, even when viewed in the light most favorable to EnerVest, 
support no other reasonable conclusion.  EnerVest attempts to inject its own 
interpretation on the facts, but the evidence is all documentary based on decades-old 
deeds, affidavits, court documents, corporate minutes, etc.  There are no live witnesses. 
All is long gone to dust.  As such, the district court correctly limited its ruling to the 
undisputed facts in the record and any reasonable inferences therefrom.  The competing 
speculations or unsupportable inferences proposed by EnerVest do not pass muster, and 
the only reasonable inference to be drawn from these facts is, as concluded by the district 
court, that the Incorporators intentionally waived the 3,000-share provision. 
III. ENERVEST’S ARGUED INCONSISTENCY WITH THE PROPOSED
DETERMINATION WAS NOT RAISED BELOW AND IS AN
INAPPROPRIATE EXPANSION OF THE SECTION 24 HEARING
EnerVest devotes ten pages in its Appellate Brief to explore its argument that “the
district court’s legal conclusion of waiver is inconsistent with the General Determination 
and the PD.”  (Aplt. Br. at 31, 31-42.)  This argument, however, was never raised below 
and is an improper attempt to expand the Section 24 hearing.  Regardless, even if this 
argument were before the Court, it fails to recognize the reality that virtually all water 
companies own water rights for use on land not owned by the water company. 
A. Failure to Preserve this Argument Below 
“To properly preserve an issue for appellate review, the issue must be raised in the 
district court,” including that it was “specifically raised, in a timely manner” and 
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“supported by evidence and relevant legal authority.”  Donjuan v. McDermott, 2011 UT 
72, ¶ 20, 266 P.3d 839 (emphasis added). 
Under the heading “Issue, Standard and Preservation,” EnerVest claims it 
preserved its arguments in its memorandum in opposition to Carlson’s motion for 
summary judgment [R2 001398-1400], its reply memorandum in support of its own 
motion for summary judgment [R2 001620-22], and arguments raised during oral 
argument [R2 002181, 002202-03].  (See Aplt. Br. at 2.)  But nowhere in these citations 
does EnerVest alert the district court that a ruling in favor of Carlson would be 
inconsistent with the Proposed Determination.  Indeed, that argument was never 
presented to the district court below and should be rejected as unpreserved. 
B. Inappropriate Attempt to Expand the Scope of the Section 24 Hearing 
EnerVest’s failure to argue inconsistency with the Proposed Determination below 
is not surprising because the district court carefully circumscribed the scope of the 
Section 24 Hearing to focus exclusively on the issue of whether the Proposed 
Determination “was correct to list [Minnie Maud] as the owner of [the Water Rights].” 
[R2 000477-79.]  In determining what appropriately belongs inside the General 
Adjudication suit and what should be brought in a separate action, the Utah Supreme 
Court has clearly stated “the only issues to be tried in a general adjudication are the rights 
to the use of the water involved . . . . No provision appears to have been made for cross-
actions for any further or different relief than the determination of the rights.”  Smith v. 
District Court, 256 P. 539 (Utah 1927) (emphasis added).  And a Section 24 Hearing, 
which is just a mini-case within the General Adjudication, cannot be expanded beyond 
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these limits.  See United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington Irr. Co., 79 P.3d 945 (Utah 2003) 
(discussing the relationship between Objections, Section 24 Hearings, and suits outside 
the General Adjudication to resolve private claims). 
EnerVest argues that Minnie Maud’s ownership of the Water Rights is 
inconsistent with the Proposed Determination because water allocation along Minnie 
Maud Creek should be dependent on irrigated acreage, which EnerVest claims is 
inconsistent with proportionate share ownership.  (Aplt. Br. at 35-39.)  This argument 
misses the mark. 
First, it was never specifically raised in the Objections, and as such is beyond the 
scope of the Section 24 Hearing. 
Second, it is an attack on other aspects of the Proposed Determination that were 
not before the district court.  It is true that the Proposed Determination provides for 
Minnie Maud ownership of the Water Rights but does not provide that all the Water 
Rights can be used on all of the shareholders’ lands (i.e., the company’s service area). 
Most water companies would prefer a service area approach to water allocation, but 
neither Minnie Maud nor any other party objected to this aspect of the Proposed 
Determination.  EnerVest nevertheless invites this Court to analyze this aspect of the 
Proposed Determination, prepared based on mapping completed long after-the-fact in 
about 1964, to glean evidence of whether the Incorporators intended to waive the 3,000-
share provision in the early 1900s.  Not only is an analysis of the authorized points of 
diversion and places of use in the Proposed Determination wholly irrelevant to the issue 
of the validity of the Deed, it represents an end-run to raise new objections to the 
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Proposed Determination.  Such arguments are untimely and not allowed.  See Utah Code 
Ann. § 73-4-11(2) (setting a 90-day time limit for raising objections).   
And third, EnerVest’s argument fails to acknowledge that water rights can be 
owned by one entity, but authorized for use only on another owner’s land.  For example, 
a water right used under a lease is often owned by one person but used on land owned by 
a separate person.  Furthermore, mutual irrigation companies are typically the record 
owners of water rights, even though the companies themselves typically hold none of the 
lands on which the water is authorized for use.  This is exactly the case here.  Minnie 
Maud, as owner of the Water Rights, need not have ever owned the land on which the 
Water Rights were used.  The Proposed Determination’s identification of aspects other 
than ownership of particular Water Rights is not before the Court, and, regardless, the 
determination of Minnie Maud as the owner of the Water Rights is dependent on the 
chain of title, not the results of a 1960s survey. 
IV. ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS EXIST TO AFFIRM THE DISTRICT
COURT’S RULING.
The district court decided the case based upon its conclusion that the Incorporators
waived compliance with the 3,000-share provision of the Articles, and did not reach 
Carlson’s alternative arguments regarding of laches and estoppel.  (MIS Carlson’s Mot. 
S.J., R2 001009-11.)  But this Court can affirm the district court’s decision on “any legal 
ground or theory apparent on the record.” Bailey, 2002 UT 58, ¶ 10. 
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A. The Doctrine of Laches Bars EnerVest from Challenging Minnie Maud’s 
Authority to Receive and Own the Water Rights 
The right to enforce a contractual condition can expire under the doctrine of 
laches.  See, e.g., Nilson-Newey & Co. v. Utah Resources Intern., 905 P.2d 312, 314 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) (holding that contractual right to obtain distribution or accounting 
was unavailable based on a twenty-year delay).  Generally, the doctrine of laches serves 
the “maxim that equity aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights.” 
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Horne, 2012 UT 66, ¶ 29, 
289 P.3d 502 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In Utah a party must prove two 
elements to establish laches: “(1) the “lack of diligence” on the part of claimant and (2) 
an injury to respondent “owing to such lack of diligence.”  Id. ¶ 29 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
As a matter of law, the doctrine of laches bars EnerVest from now challenging 
Minnie Maud’s authority to own the Water Rights.  The following facts, each of which 
were not disputed, establish the applicability of laches:  (1) in April 1902, the 
incorporators were each mentioned by name in the Articles of Incorporation, which noted 
how many shares each person was issued, [R2 000802]; (2) the incorporators constructed, 
maintained, and used water delivery structures, including a reservoir in which they stored 
the water from Minnie Maud Creek for the benefit of the Incorporators, [Addendum D, 
R2 000843-44, 000988, 001664]; (3) in May 1902, the incorporators each signed and 
executed the deed conveying “all their and each of their rights and claims of every kind 
. . . in and to the waters of Minnie Maud Creek . . . unto the Minnie Maud Reservoir and 
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Irrigation Company and its assigns forever,” [Addendum D, R2 001447]; (4) from 1903 
through 1905, they participated in a lawsuit under the name of Minnie Maud [R2 001043, 
001663-64]; (5) between 1902 and 1955, the incorporators and their 
successor shareholders held and took records of corporate meetings [R2 001664]; and 
(6) there is no evidence that anyone asserted Minnie Maud’s purported nonexistence 
between 1902 and 1957—a period of 55 years.  [See generally R1 and R2; see also T. F. 
Housekeeper’s Ans. to Compl., at R2 001317 (May 23, 1957) (asserting Minnie Maud’s 
nonexistence for the first time).] 
EnerVest cannot now pursue decades-old claims.  If EnerVest or its predecessors 
wished to assert ownership of the Water Rights based on Minnie Maud’s issuing only 
2,377 shares, they were obliged to do so far sooner than 1957.  The predecessors’ failure 
to raise this issue for more than 55 years is more than sufficient to satisfy the lack of 
diligence element.  And there is no evidence in the record, either directly or through 
inference, that could establish EnerVest or its predecessors didn’t sleep on their rights for 
more than half a century.  If courts did not apply laches to such a great length of time, 
“there would be no limitation whatever, and property would be thrown into confusion.” 
Bowman v. Wathen, 42 U.S. 189, 194 (1843) (noting laches was founded on the principle 
that equitable claims “must be acted upon, at the utmost, within twenty years.” 
(quotations omitted)).  EnerVest’s “predecessors have slumbered on their rights,” Insight 
Assets, Inc. v. Farias, 2013 UT 47, ¶ 22, and equity bars their decades-old challenge, see 
id. (concluding laches barred a party from asserting a three-year-old claim). 
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Moreover, this lack of diligence indisputably results in an injury to Minnie Maud’s 
shareholders.  The original incorporators agreed to receive water deliveries in proportion 
to their stock ownership.  [See Articles, R2 000805-06.]  They conveyed all of their 
canals, locks, damns, gates, and weirs to Minnie Maud, to be shared in proportion to their 
share ownership.  [Id.]  They agreed to work as a collective to build and maintain more 
water delivery structures.  [Id.]  Since that time, Minnie Maud’s shares were treated as 
having value in proportion to their ownership of the Water Rights, and both Carlson and 
his predecessors bought and sold those shares based on that value.  EnerVest’s attempt to 
rescind this century-old agreement will result in injury to Minnie Maud’s shareholders by 
stripping them of their rightful position as owners of the Water Rights, and would injure 
their ability to receive and use the water authorized by those rights. 
As a matter of law under the undisputed facts, even drawn in the light most 
favorable to EnerVest, by failing to timely enforce or even raise the 3,000-share 
provision of the Articles for more than 55 years (from 1902 to 1957), EnerVest and its 
predecessors are barred from pursuing that claim now.  Thus, the Court has more than 
adequate grounds to affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the 
alternative basis of laches. 
B. Estoppel Precludes EnerVest from Challenging Minnie Maud’s Authority 
to Receive and Own the Water Rights 
A related principle—if not identical when applied in this context—is that of 
estoppel.  Estoppel has broad application and many definitions.  For example, “equitable 
estoppel” is defined as (1) a “failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later 
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asserted.” (2) “reasonable action or inaction by the other party” based on the first party’s 
failure to act, and (3) injury to the second party . . . from allowing the first party to 
contradict or repudiate such . . . failure to act.”  Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 
2007 UT 28, ¶14, 158 P.3d 1088 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Another definition 
is “quasi-estoppel,” which “precludes a party from asserting, to another’s disadvantage, a 
right inconsistent with a position [it has] previously taken.”  In re RBFS, 2012 UT App 
132, ¶ 31, 278 P.3d 143 (quotations omitted); cf. Harding v. Indus. Comm’n of Utah, 83 
Utah 376, 28 P.2d 182, 184-85 (1934) (noting the principle of “quasi estoppel,” and 
concluding a litigant was estopped from making certain arguments).  The quasi-estoppel 
doctrine “applies when it would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a 
position inconsistent with one to which he acquiesced.”  In re RBFS, 2012 UT App 132, ¶ 
31. Quasi-estoppel does not require proof of reliance by the party asserting it.  See Smith
v. DenRoss Contracting, U.S., Inc., 737 S.E.2d 392, 399 (N.C. App. 2012).
But no matter the definition of estoppel, the core “doctrine of estoppel applies 
where a person undertakes to deny as true that which she has by her solemn acts and 
daily conduct over a long period of years avowed as true.”  Tanner v. Provo Reservoir 
Co., 289 P. 151, 154 (Utah 1930) (quotations omitted).  Thus, courts have held that 
“parties may, by their agreements or conduct, estop themselves from denying the 
existence of the corporation.”  Am. Vending Servs., Inc. v. Morse, 881 P.2d 917, 920 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Based on the undisputed facts, EnerVest should be estopped from now objecting 
to Minnie Maud’s ownership of the Water Rights.  Over a century ago, in 1902, the 
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Incorporators executed a deed conveying the Water Rights to Minnie Maud.  [Addendum 
D, R2 001447.]  Soon thereafter, they appointed a board, which held meetings, appointed 
a water master, and levied assessments.  [Addendum E, R2 000909-913, R2 001454-58 
(indicating the Board of Directors appointed likely EnerVest predecessor J.C. Johnston as 
water master for $100 per year).]  In 1903, the Incorporators participated in and 
acquiesced to the Grames lawsuit in which Minnie Maud defended its claim of ownership 
over the Water Rights [R2 001304-15], and they continued to acquiesce to Minnie 
Maud’s role until the Utah Supreme Court issued its 1905 Grames decision affirming the 
district court, Minnie Maud Res. & Irr. Co. v. Grames, 81 P. 893, 893 (Utah 1905) [R2 
001043-47].  Indeed, D.C. Johnston (misstated as Johnson in the opinion), another likely 
EnerVest predecessor, testified on behalf of Minnie Maud in Grames.  Id. at 894. 
EnerVest and the Objectors did not present a single document or other piece of 
admissible evidence to the district court indicating that an original Incorporator ever 
disputed Minnie Maud’s existence or ownership of the Water Rights, and no successor to 
the Incorporators raised the issue until 1957.  (R2 001317.)  Finally, EnerVest’s own 
predecessor, Thomas A. Christensen, treated Minnie Maud as a valid entity when he 
wrote a letter dated Aug. 1, 1962, in which he affirmatively represented to the State 
Engineer that Minnie Maud had officers and had issued stock.  [Addendum F, R1 4130.]  
He identified himself as one of those officers, and went on to identify himself and his 
brother (Bud Christensen) as shareholders.  [Id.] 
Those undisputed facts demonstrate that EnerVest’s predecessors treated Minnie 
Maud as being a valid and existing entity.  Therefore, as a matter of law, EnerVest cannot 
now claim Minnie Maud's nonexistence where its predecessors did not do so for at least 
fifty-five years from 1902 to 1957. When shareholders "have dealt with the corporation 
since its organization, and have recognized its powers and acquiesced in the exercise 
thereof for a large number of years, they are estopped from questioning in such a 
proceeding as this the rightful existence of the corporation." Marsh v. Mathias, 56 P. 
1074, 1075 (Utah 1899). EnerVest's predecessor "recognized the organization as a 
corporation in business dealings," and anyone claiming a successive interest "should not 
be allowed to quibble." See Am. Vending Servs., 881 P .2d at 923. 
Thus, the Court has more than adequate grounds to affirm the district court's grant 
of summary judgment on the alternative basis of estoppel. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Carlson respectfully requests that this Court 
affirm the district court's grant of his motion for summary judgment. 
DATED this 18th day of January, 2016. 
PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS, P .C. 
39 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Utah R. App. P. 24(t)(l) 
because this brief contains 10,864 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Utah 
R. App. P. 24(t)(l)(B). 
This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Utah R. App. P. 27(b) because 
this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 2013, 
in Times New Roman, font size 13. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 15th day of March, 2017, I caused two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE MICHAEL CARLSON to be served 
via U.S. Mail, first-class postage prepaid, on the following: 
John H. Mabey, Jr. (4725) 
David C. Wright (5566) 
Jonathan R. Schutz (13352) 
MABEY WRIGHT & JAMES 
175 South Main, #1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 




Attorneys for Appellant Ener Vest, LTD 
Benjamin J. Jensen (14216) 
Sarah M. Shechter (15357) 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS GENERAL 
Sean D. Reyes (7969) 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
1594 W. North Temple, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Telephone: (801) 538-7227 
bjensen@utah.gov 
Attorneys for Appellee Utah State Engineer 
4842-7034-4256, v. 8 
ii 
Addendum Contents 
A. Minnie Maud Timeline (Part of Supplemental Record) 
B. Certificate of Incorporation (R2 001449) 
C. Anderson Affidavit (R2 000843-44) 
D. Water Right Deed (R2 001447) 
E. Minnie Maud Meeting Minutes (R2 000909-13, 001454-58) 
F. 1962 Letter from T.A. Christensen to State Engineer re Minnie Maud 
(R1 004130) 
G. Stipuilated Order Granting the Section 24 Petition (R2 000262-65) 
Addendum A 
Minnie Maud Time Line 
March 27, 1902 Minnie Maud Articles of Incorporation Filed (Tab 1) 
April 11, 1902 Minnie Maud Certificate of Incorporation Issued by Utah Secretary of State (Tab 2) 
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mont; n.nd on.th m· a.ffh·mai:i.un, oel'tifted by tho /laid Clorlt,; that Ila.id. artiololl oon.ta.in tho 1tatem11nt 
of far.t.t ;·tiqu.irod. bu la.to, m~ that said corporation ia k6rsb!J oo/'Wti~"ted a bod.y oorpo1·<!-t•, with 1iJht 
of' at£0C6JBi.cn. 1u ;;por:iftod. in. i.tH aaid a.rti/JUa of aJ1•eemen.t, and ii he1·eby au.thori:eed to ex111·oiao 
nll tho frmJJti01i.•, 011ioy all the pl'ivileJea ~f a Corporation., and to tran.aaot all bu.rin.11/lll of said. 
Cm·wwrtti.nn, ,,., .tp11Cifted in. its llaid a.rti.cu.• of a.treement. 
e 
Jn a:uumony Ulllbereof, I luwo horou.n.to aet my hand a~ffe.l:ecL ths G1·eu.t 
Seal of aid Shz,~ at Salt La/"8 City, thi,.,,,,,, .. , ,(t;~ 
a.. •f~-tjth:zL._,. D. 190_e • 
~tH?ld u. &-tHt~ 
&ECRETARV OF STATE. 
$tate of tlltab, 
$11\ct or Btcrcta~'n-1/. / ,,f' · 
1'o ... -ff!p~d]1~~~ .... = 
OtJrUftcate of thl> Cler'/c, of tha Oou.nty of==~o....)l.'..LJ:J;J:4-AL/:<'4'.J:..(.-...,....,..,,.,.,.,....,,,_.....,""""_...,,_~,...,.,,,, 
to the effeot, that ths a.paomimt and oath or aff/,rmatio~ o 
of 8aitl iusooia.twn had b111Jn. ftlod, in hil offlos on tho-C/ ~ .h=:n.-.-aa 
a:n.d that th11r11 ha8 al.to bun. filed in. my olftos with aa 
mfJn.t; and oath or afflrmatwn., oertift&d by _ths said CltJrlt,; that said 
0
artuloll oon.ta.in the atatomont 
of fa.au required by law, r1.ru:L that aaid. oorporation ·t,, he11ebv 0-0rwtitu~d, a ~dy 0-0rpur;,_'te, wlth ritht 
of 11.t.<J01l11aion all apeoifted in. it., 11aitL arttol113 of a.JrtJoment; and i.f hsrebv au.t"'9ri.z&d to ax6rt1Us 






















I, DP.VlD Am>BRSON, being duly sworn upon oa.th. dopose and 
say1 
· ·1 am Bl years of aga and was born in ieea. My father was 
Brastua Anc!eraon. I live at Price at the present time. 
ln 1898 IQ' father JaOYed to Nine Mile with hia family. I was 
16 years of ap at the time. We moved onto the first pl.ace "1hen you 
come into Sina Mile Which ia now the Bernard Iriart place. My father 
.and we boys worked on the farm and biad some livestock that we run in 
the area. My father purchased the rranlt warren relinquishn\ent on the 
homestead, ho then 'homeateaded 160 acres wbicb we lived on and he proved 
up on,Sy the enCl of 19021 We had broken up and werG faming approxi• 
mately 20 acres of land. Approximately 16 acroe was bel01' the road 
and approJd.Jlllltely 4 acres above the rOBd. The present road is in about 
the same location as it was in 1902. 
we continued to live on the farm and I left 1n the fall of 
1911. Ml' father sold out the place to crawford and Monk of Manti ili 
1912 and my father left tho area at that time. 
I waa 1n th& area in 1902 and heard the 11\en on Minnie Maud 
creek tallc about the water prol:>lema and 1dm fuming m the Minn10 Maud 
IrrifaUon ~. 'l'hia company \fa& organized in 1902 for the main 
purpose of building a reservoir on the creek to increase the W&ter 
supply. Bel Lee '11l8 tbe m11in 1n.atig&tor of the organization and toolt 
an active part in it. As I recall, my father received 39 shares in 
tha 1rri9atian company. I am not sure What the axact basis was for the 
num))er of shares tbllt each water user too~, but as ca CJ&DBral proposi~ion 
the ah.ares that they were to receive in the COJDpany was baaed upon the 
number of acres that they irrigated at that time in Minnie Maud creek 
plus water they oxpac:ted to get from the reservoir. 1'he plan was to 
put in tim and lal>or and teams and scrapers and build the reservoir · 
themselves an4 in this way increase the amount of water I.that would be 
avai~lo during the farming season. 1 am not fW!liliar with the amount 
of stodc that ~rs owned other than my father received in the irri"' 
gation company. · 
Right after the company was organised all the water users on 
»lin.nie Mau4 creek wont to work with hand tools, teams and aero.para to 
build the reservoir up Minnie Maud canyon just above the ~eaent Gane 
Anderson place. ~ brother and I worked on this reservoir for a couple 
of years. 1 remember that B4 I.Se had two or three teams and s=apera 
workinCJ on this reservoir ~t times. Bone of us worked continuously, 
w just put in time on the reservoir ~en we had time available. Thia 
reservoir site was a natural bilsin and did not require a great amount of 
fill. we made a clltch frona Minnie Naud creelt higher up to lead water 
wan it was available into the reservoir. · wa placed in a head gate on 
the side of the reservoir that was closeat to Minnie Maud Creek. Thia 
vaa a wooden head gate with a steel plate or gate that hAd a large nut 
oia th" top that you tuned with a wrench. KY father made the head gate 
and shaped the steol that vent into the gate. I was present when this 
was done. '1be res~ir was OOIQPleted in tvo or three years Whid\ would 
be &))out 1905 and water waa stored in it. I remenal>er on one occasion 
at leaet that B4 Lee aalctad me and Pred Grames to go up to the reservoir 
and turn water down to him for bis tum. we took with ua a large wrac:h 
thllt waul4 fit this nut on tbe top of the gate and I remember we 
dropped it in thG water and had to dive into the water of the reservoir 
to get the urenc:h badt. 
There were some years that th.are wasn•t enough hi~ water 
availal>le to atore in tbs reservoir, other years the reservoir' had water 
in it and some years U: was full. This reservoir continud to bold 
water watil around 1911 or 1913, I cannot remember the ™ct year, 
around tbis time, the dam washed out and vas never repaired an.cl the 
000844
. , 
reoervou never held any more water until it was reatoraa by &be:ddan 
Powall 1n the 1940s. 
I Clon't know the number of am:G feet. that thia reseJ:VOir 
held. It vas not a larqe reservoir. l have frequently been oat. to 
Sina 1$11e, the last time was about tbrea ysara ago and I have aeen tbe 
reaenoir that Shoddan Powa1l has constructed. lb:. ~ll •a resar-
voir ie thGt eama one that we atartea building in 1902, 1s in the same 
location Wl4 has the same capacity. 
Around 1902 and 1903 I beard the water users on Rinnl'll Maud 
·creeJc,and especially Mr. Lee, talk about buildinCJ other reservoirs .. 
They diacuased building a reservoir at ld\at. was referred to as the 
BeaVer V&lleyo This location ·would be nine or ten mil&s up Minnie 
Naud CAQyOn from where Minnie Maud comes into Dine M1leo The other 
:w:eeenoir was alx»ut aix·muea up thie eams canyon. This Beaver Valley 
reservoir never cl:l.d materiaU.ze. 'l'hers was nave: any work done on it. 
As to the operation of the Minnie .Maud Irrigation Compw\y I 
lcnow of no stockholders me.atinqs or directors meetings that they eve~ 
held while I was still there. The irrigation CQD\PB.QY never had a 
water nwJter and all the water users too~ their own wat~ from their 
own glac:ea of a1version and this water was never regulated or contro,J.led 
by the irr19ation ~. After I left the area in the fall of 1911 
I don't know what was done ill this reBpect. 
Moat of the people tholt wore in that area around 1902 have died. 
TherQ la a Mrs. Westwood that. lived on the David Russell place that is 
now owned :by Sheridan Powell . I believe she is still alive but I 
don't 'know her address. 
1963. 
subscribed and sworn to before me this ~day of August, 
llit Coom:u;~• t::,!: . , 11.J'<~ 6. 194' 
!t,.:.J '"<•. P1::, t :·:J. 
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;. p. : ao(J \. 
~~.,.......~ . 
Price Utah,A.ug l 1962 
Mr.!Dlrold Don•ldson 
State Engineers O~fioe 
Room 442 State Capitol Bl4g. 
~alt ta.lee City Utah. 
Dear Sirt Following ia the list of Offloera of the Minnie 
Kand Irrigation Go. 
E.EJ>aYia President 
~td Huoakeeper Vioe Pres • 
. Glen 'Allred Direo tor 
T • .l.Chrtateaaen 11 • 
011Te Davia Sea• 
Following 18 the list of Stookholdera and the &mOWlt of stock 
owned by each, 
Ernest E.DaTis Jro (Glen Allred) l,429 Shares 
~T.A.Obriatenaen ~ 899 1/.2 ,, ( 399 Shares 
'.. B\ld Christensen 19 i'/2 '.' 
!re4 Ko\18keepar . 260 ~· L·ouis Jlo tte 68 '! 
Bernard Iriat i9 · n 
Amber ICeel 182 It 
Tota1!~3'11 
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The Order of Court is stated below:
Dated: June 20, 2014 /s/ SAMUEL P CHIARA
08:17:21 AM District Court Judge
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